NYDFS Penalizes Eleven Insurers Over Deferred-to-Immediate Annuity Replacements

Nov 19, 2026

Between December 2018 and March 2021, the New York State Department of Financial Services ("DFS") entered into consent orders with eleven life insurers arising from an industry-wide investigation of deferred-to-immediate annuity replacements. The largest of these, announced in March 2021, required one insurer to pay a $5,529,000 civil monetary penalty and approximately $5.4 million in restitution to New York consumers, for a total of roughly $10.9 million. That order covered 3,686 replacement contracts.

The other ten orders were smaller. DFS resolved the first in December 2018, six more on September 24, 2019, and three on April 9, 2020. Penalties in those orders ranged from $26,000 to $692,000, and the number of replacement contracts at issue ranged from 26 to 692. Across all eleven orders, the penalties totaled approximately $7.4 million and the orders covered approximately 5,800 replacement contracts.

Order dateInsurerReplacement contractsCivil monetary penalty
December 5, 2018N******* *********476$240,000
September 24, 2019G*******224$224,000
September 24, 2019C********186$186,000
September 24, 2019P*** ******133$133,000
September 24, 2019U***** ****** ****76$69,000
September 24, 2019P*********40$35,000
September 24, 2019N*********** ******26$26,000
April 9, 2020M*********692$692,000
April 9, 2020P****** ****172$172,000
April 9, 2020L******70$70,000
March 1, 2021N** **** ****3,686$5,529,000, plus approximately $5.4 million in restitution
Total11 insurers5,781$7,376,000 in penalties

Insurer names are abbreviated. The full consent orders are available from DFS at the sources listed below.

The Transactions at Issue

Each order concerned the same type of transaction: a consumer's existing deferred annuity was replaced with a single premium immediate annuity issued by the insurer. DFS found that the insurers did not obtain annuitization information for the deferred annuity being replaced, and that the disclosure statements required under Insurance Regulation 60 (11 NYCRR Part 51) omitted the annuitization payout available under the existing contract. As a result, according to DFS, certain consumers gave up more favorable guaranteed income and received less income for substantially similar payout options.

The size of each insurer's book varied widely. The findings did not.

The Supervisory Findings

Beyond the disclosure failures, DFS found that the insurers failed to adequately train their agents and brokers on suitability reviews and replacement disclosures, failed to maintain adequate supervisory controls over those producers, and did not establish a supervisory system reasonably designed to achieve compliance with Insurance Regulation 187 (11 NYCRR Part 224). DFS concluded in each case that the insurer had violated both Regulation 187 and Regulation 60.

Remediation

In addition to the penalties, the insurers agreed to a review and restitution process. That process requires a comparison of each replaced deferred annuity with the replacement contract, repayment of shortfalls with interest, and an increase in future periodic payments for consumers who were harmed. The insurers also agreed to obtain and disclose income information in all future deferred-to-immediate replacements.

What This May Mean for Supervision

Most of the individual penalties were modest by DFS standards, and the largest order shows how quickly the figures can grow once restitution is added. The more significant point may be the pattern. DFS did not treat these as isolated producer errors. It examined replacement activity across the industry over more than two years and reached the same conclusion at insurer after insurer: the information needed to judge whether a replacement served the consumer was not being collected, and the supervisory system was not designed to catch that gap.

It is difficult to say whether DFS will revisit replacement practices in the same way. Insurers that rely on application-level review alone, however, may find it harder to show that their supervisory controls are reasonably designed, particularly where the relevant facts surface in the sales conversation rather than on the application.